Abstract-A new approach to the characterization of network connectivity under transmission rate and secrecy constraints is proposed, based on a rate-secrecy graph model. The proposed model is based on an information theoretic framework, and rate-distortion requirements are used to characterize the level of secrecy for individual links in the network. Rate-secrecyconnectivity tradeoffs are illustrated and it is shown that by relaxing the secrecy constraint, an acceptable secrecy level can be achieved while significantly improving network connectivity and transmission rate efficiency for the wireless nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION

S
ECRECY assurance comes as a natural property of the physical layer, and can be exploited at the expense of a lower transmission rate and higher energy expenditure per bit. There is a rich literature on characterizing the information theoretic secrecy capacity of the physical layer that can be achieved at the link level for wireless transmissions, starting with the wire-tap channel model introduced by Wyner [4] , for which it is shown that if an eavesdropper has a worse channel than the intended receiver, a non-zero perfect secrecy rate can be achieved. Based on this eavesdropper-worsethan-receiver channel condition, earlier work in the literature has proposed network connectivity models based on a secrecy graph framework [3] showing that network connectivity can be greatly affected by secrecy requirements (see also [5] and [6] ).
In this work, we expand the graph model proposed in [3] to introduce a more accurate description of secrecy requirements, which specifically accounts for the secrecy rate, as well as for the overall transmission rate requirements for individual links. The proposed rate-secrecy graph provides a general framework that can capture the tradeoffs between transmission rate (which also reflects energy expenditure per bit for a given transmission power budget), secrecy rate, and connectivity. A better understanding of these tradeoffs will allow for a graceful degradation of performance in wireless networks when resources are scarce. We consider the problem of transmitting information from a source to a destination node via a Gaussian channel with multiplicative fading gain coefficients. We adopt the partial secrecy capacity proposed in [1] and [2] for which the transmission requires some security protection against eavesdropper nodes with additional transmission rate constraints. We note that, for a fixed power budget, the transmission rate constraints directly map into energy per bit constraints.
In [1] partial secrecy is achieved by splitting the initial data stream into private and non-private sub-streams, and transmitting the former under perfect secrecy constraints and the latter with no secrecy, using superposition encoding [1] , [7] . This sub-stream splitting can be implemented using an inverse lossy compression approach. i.e., the most significant information will be allocated to the private sub-stream. The partial secrecy-capacity region for transmission between two nodes at locations x i and x j , with an eavesdropper e* is given similarly to [1, eq. (6)]
where R 0 represents the rate of transmission for the nonprivate sub-stream, R 1 represents the rate of transmission for the private sub-stream, and it is guaranteed that the secrecy rate R s is at least equal to the private sub-stream rate. In (1), μ 2 and σ 2 represent the channel noise levels at the receiver and eavesdropper, respectively, P represents the transmission power, with a power fraction β allocated to the private stream, β being optimized to achieve the rate capacity region [1] . The average link gain in (1) can be determined based on the distance between the receiving and the transmitting nodes:
where α is the amplitude loss exponent.
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The achieved privacy level is defined based on (1) by introducing a rate distortion level metric, defined as the percentage of the source rate that achieves secrecy, and as such, it will not be available at the eavesdropper:
It has been shown in [1] and [2] that the level of privacy is a subjective perception of the user and can be determined visually for an example of image transmission (see Fig.1 ).
The level of privacy proposed in [1] and [2] ranges from low to high, characterized by a higher and respectively a lower percentage of the transmission rate being detected by the eavesdropper (common stream). In Fig. 1 we show the common sub-stream image that the eavesdropper would be able to decode from the transmission of the Lena image for an imposed distortion level of D = 0.6, i.e., a medium privacy level. We note that the intended receiver will decode both common and private sub-streams for a perfect reconstruction of the image. Energy requirements can be characterized using the energy consumption per bit metric, determined for a power budget P:
To better understand the impact of privacy requirements on the network connectivity, we derive a geometric constraint requirement that specifies the minimum distance ratios from the transmitter to the receiver and eavesdropper respectively, such that a certain distortion requirement can be achieved at the eavesdropper, given the energy constraints.
We define the distance ratio as the ratio of the distance between the transmitter and eavesdropper to that between the transmitter and receiver as
where R = maximum distance transmission achievable between the transmitter and receiver for given rate and secrecy constraints, and r = minimum distance requirement between the transmitter and eavesdropper.
Using (2) and (6) in conjunction with (1), we rewrite the partial secrecy capacity as follows: Fig. 2 shows the dependence of the achievable secrecy rate, the overall transmission rate, the non-private stream rate and the distortion at the eavesdropper, as functions of the distance ratio metric. Numerical results were obtained for α = 2 and μ 2 = σ 2 = 1. Unless otherwise specified, R = 1.
From Fig. 2 we note that the highest transmission rate (yielding the most energy efficient transmission) is obtained for the case in which the eavesdropper is much further away than the intended receiver (large ξ ). This case also corresponds to perfect secrecy, but will enforce stricter constraints on the link availability at the network level and thus it will negatively impact connectivity. As the eavesdropper is allowed to be closer to the transmitter, the network connectivity will improve, but at the expense of lower transmission rate, and consequently lower energy efficiency, as well as decreased distortion at the eavesdropper.
From the above results, it becomes apparent that the network connectivity can be increased either by increasing the allowable distance ratio (secrecy constraint) or by increasing the reliable transmission distance (energy constraint). We can infer that relaxing the perfect secrecy constraints may result in increased connectivity for the network.
In what follows, we will further quantify the connectivity metrics using a random graph network model, with the focus on analyzing the tradeoffs with the other key performance metrics: energy/transmission rate and secrecy constraints.
III. THE RATE-SECRECY GRAPH
Consider a wireless network in which legitimate nodes and potential eavesdroppers are randomly scattered in space, according to a Poisson point process. In [3] , the secrecy constraint is captured at the network level by invalidating links that do not meet the condition that the closest eavesdropping node is further away from the transmitter than the receiver is. The secrecy condition in [3] is equivalent to a geometric condition: r ≥ R. However, this condition does not capture the rate transmission requirements for individual links.
From the results in Section II, we refine this geometric constraint to be tightly linked with transmission and secrecy rate requirements. Based on (1) and (6), we can derive distance ratio constraints to meet the transmission rate, energy, and secrecy requirements. We can then define a family of ratesecrecy graphs, parametrized by the secrecy and rate constraints, such that links that do not meet these constraints are eliminated from the network communication graph. Let = {x i } ⊂ R d denote the set of legitimate nodes, and E = {e i } ⊂ R d denote the set of eavesdroppers. We define the rate secrecy family of graphs G = { , E} (E b ,R s ) , parametrized by energy per bit and secrecy rate requirements, as the graph with vertex set and edge set
where C ps is the partial secrecy capacity of the link between the transmitter x i and the receiver x j ; η is a threshold representing the minimum required transmission rate for each communication link, and η D is a threshold representing the required minimum secrecy rate for the individual links.
The edge existence condition in (8) can be expressed as a geometric relationship between the requirements for the distance to the receiver relative to the distance to the eavesdropper as a function of distortion and energy per bit consumption constraints based on (1) and (6), with η = η /2:
As in [3] , we define the Poisson rate-secrecy graph as a ratesecrecy graph for which and E are mutually independent, homogeneous Poisson point processes with densities λ and λ E , respectively, and consider a unit arrival rate for the friendly nodes Poisson point process, λ = 1.
We now redefine the rate-secrecy graphs as being parametrized by the transmission range and the distance ratio requirements that incorporate energy and secrecy constraints. We denote the rate-secrecy graph by − → G 1,λ E ,R,ξ , where the radius R is the maximum transmission distance achievable between transmitter and receiver, r is the minimum distance requirement between transmitter and eavesdropper and ξ is the distance ratio r/R.
We rewrite the edge condition in (9) based on definition (6):
We can see from (10) that a rate-secrecy capacity feasibility condition can be obtained by requiring ξ to be positive, and it is given by
The bounds in (10) and (11) hold for β ∈ [0, 1]. Equation (11) gives a bound on the maximum transmission range that can be achieved, given transmission rate, energy per bit consumption, and eavesdroppers distortion constraints. We can see that, for a given transmission rate and distortion requirements, the range of transmission can be made infinitely large by allowing infinitely large transmission power, with the energy per bit consumption going to infinity.
We can see from (10) and (11) that secrecy can be achieved when we impose range and distance ratio constraints.
IV. IMPACT ON NETWORK CONNECTIVITY
We study the connectivity of the network by determining the out-degree distributions of the nodes, the probability of out-isolation, and the average out-degree for an arbitrary node in the network.
We consider two cases: (a) the range limited case for which R is limited to a maximum value; and (b) the R −→∝ case, which corresponds to the unlimited transmission power case.
A. Rate-Secrecy Graph: The Unlimited Power Scenario
For the case of unlimited transmission power, no range transmission limit is imposed. To calculate the out-degree of a vertex we follow a derivation similar to that in [3] , where we replace the condition R < r with R ≤ ξr . We determine the out-degree probability to be
The probability that the origin node cannot communicate with another node in − → G ,λ E ,∝,ξ (out-isolation) is then determined to be
B. Rate-Secrecy Graph: The Limited Power Scenario
When a transmission power constraint is imposed, a maximum transmission range R can be determined as in (11). Fig. 3 . Out-degree probability -unlimited range scenario.
As in [3] , we distinguish two cases: 1) There is no eavesdropper inside a circle with radius r = ξ R. This case occurs with probability
For this scenario, the number of friendly nodes inside the radius R is given by a Poisson distribution, with mean π R 2 .
2) There is an eavesdropper at radius ρ. Then the number of friendly nodes is given by a Poisson distribution restricted to a radius R = ρ/ξ, having a mean of π R 2 = πρ 2 /ξ 2 .
Averaging cases 1) and 2) and making the change of variable r = ρ 2 /ξ 2 , we obtain an out-degree probability expression similar to that in [3] , but for an enhanced equivalent arrival rate for the eavesdropper, λ * E = λ E ξ 2 :
with a = π R 2 (λ * E + 1), R = transmission range, and (·, ·) = the upper incomplete gamma function. The probability of out-isolation is then given as
The mean out and in degrees can be determined to be
For numerical results, we assume λ = 1m −2 and λ E = 0.08m −2 . Fig. 3 analyzes the dependence of the out-degree probability on the level of privacy required for the unlimited range scenario. ξ is selected for perfect secrecy (D = 1) and for a value of distortion that gives a good level of privacy (D = 0.6, as in Fig. 1 ). We note the significant impact on network connectivity that the secrecy constraint imposes. Note also that ξ = 1 (which corresponds to the secrecy constraint imposed in [3] ) yields zero secrecy (D = 0) when transmission rate and energy constraints are also imposed.
In Fig. 4 we illustrate the dependence of the probability of out-isolation and the mean out degree on ξ for the case of limited transmission range. We can see that as the secrecy requirements increase (with the increase of ξ ), the probability of out-isolation significantly increases. In particular, we note that to obtain perfect secrecy, under transmission rate requirements, a ξ minimum value of 2.5 is required (see Fig. 2 ), which leads to a 3.4 fold increase in the outisolation probability compared to the case studied in [3] and a 58% decrease in the average mean degree for a vertex. We also note that by relaxing the secrecy constraints and imposing a distortion at the eavesdropper of D = 0.6 (obtained for ξ = 2), there is a 73% reduction for the out-isolation probability and a 72% increase in the mean out-degree for an arbitrary vertex, compared to the case of perfect secrecy.
